



3.3. Persons affiliated with foreign forces

COMMON ANALYSIS

Last update: June 2026

This profile refers to individuals associated with the foreign troops which were present in Afghanistan, primarily interpreters, and security guards, as well as civilian contractors, and logistics personnel whose involvement was visible or otherwise known to their community. Situation of family members is also addressed.

This profile should be read in conjunction with [3.1. Members of the security institutions of the former government](#).

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI products: [Country Focus 2026](#), [4.1.1.](#), [4.1.2.](#), [4.1.3.](#), [4.1.4.](#), [4.2.](#); [Country Focus 2024](#), [4.1.1.](#), [4.1.2.](#), [4.1.3.](#), [4.1.4.](#), [4.1.5.](#), [4.2.](#); Country Guidance should not be referred to as a source of COI.

During the conflict, before the takeover, persons working with foreign forces were seen as traitors and were a priority target of the Taliban. The general amnesty extends to individuals affiliated with foreign forces; however, many violations have been reported and persons under this profile have been described as particularly vulnerable and being 'hunted down'. Many individuals left the country, including through evacuations, and others live in hiding out of fear of retribution.

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution?

Acts to which persons affiliated with foreign forces could be exposed are of a such severe nature that they would amount to persecution. In particular, many cases of killings, detentions, torture and other forms of ill-treatment have been documented. House searches, death threats and torture to receive information on the whereabouts of persons under this profile are reported, including after a major data leak which revealed the names of 18 000 Afghans who worked for the British forces. Following the data breach, the de facto authorities have reportedly conducted house searches of family members as well as allegedly killed some of them in their attempt to locate persons appearing on the lists.

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?

Given the severity of treatment and the high level of targeting by the Taliban, **a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated** for individuals affiliated with

foreign forces as defined in the scope.


Family members may also have a well-founded fear of persecution as relatives have reportedly been targeted to exert pressure on persons formerly affiliated with the foreign forces.

In the case of a female applicant under this profile, it is reminded that in light of the current situation, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for Afghan women and girls.

For additional information, see [3.13. Women and girls](#)

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?

Persecution of individuals under this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of **political opinion** as they are seen as ‘spies’ and collaborators of foreign forces fighting the Taliban.



Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile, as persons affiliated with foreign forces may have been involved in excludable acts. See [7. Exclusion](#).